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An Empirical Test of The Market Relaxation - State 
Compression Hypothesis 
Christopher B. Barrett* 
Introduction 
A central aim of agricultural liberalization efforts in African countries -has been to 
improve farmers' incentives so as to stimulate productivity and growth. But 
policymakers have little if any direct economic contact with farmers. Rather, if policy 
reforms are to influence individuals' behavior through changes to price incentives, then 
markets must transmit intended, stimulative signals throughout the economy. Yet market 
conditions are endogenous to the liberalization process. In particular, the extent to which 
spatially and temporally distinct markets are integrated can change sharply with 
fundamental policy reforms. This paper empirically tests these effects, examining how 
liberalization efforts in the 1980s affected spatial and temporal food market integration in 
Madagascar. 
What is market integration? In the space domain, if a shock to the price of a 
commoditY in one market due to purely local demand or supply perturbations becomes 
manifest in another market's price, then the two are said to be_ "integrated." This is 
closely to the concept of "tradability," as commonly applied to international trade. In 
contrast, if shocks to one market's price are never felt in another market, the two are 
proclaimed not integrated, or "segmented," with obvious implications of nontradability. 
If two markets are perfectly integrated with respect to a particular commodity, there 
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should be a one-to-one correspondence between the two price series, while if they are 
perfectly segmented, their price series should be statistically independent. In the time 
domain, the concept of tradability implies an intertemporal arbitrage condition: that the 
rate at which prices increase over time equals the ratio of the real interest rate to the 
depreciation (loss) rate, appropriately adjusted for risk effects.) Analogously, substantial 
deviations from the intertemporal arbitrage condition imply market segmentation across 
time periods. 
The notion of market integration thus really concerns the free flow of goods and 
infonnation - which together detennine prices- over space and time. Hence its close 
relationship to concepts of efficiency. Government interference often impedes such 
flows, thereby inducing inefficiencies. Hence one motivation for market liberalization. 
Moreover, the efficacy of policy measures that rely on changing (relative) prices to 
induce behavioral change depends fundamentally on the strength of transmission of 
market price signals across space and over time. If markets are not integrated spatially, 
the cross-sectional aggregation of demand and supply that is central to sectoral and 
macroeconomic analysis loses its logical foundation, and state-initiated signals may have 
little or no effect on local prices and behaviors. Similarly, if markets are not seasonally 
integrated, intertemporal aggregation of demand and supply becomes artificial, and 
seasonal cycles in income and prices become especially important determinants of 
consumption and production behaviors. 
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Simply put, segmented markets demand more costly, disaggregated analysis. 
Moreover, segmented markets are more likely to require relaxation of the convenient 
assumption of perfectly competitive markets, if only because smaller markets are more 
susceptible to the emergence of natural monopolies due to the minimum efficient scale of 
intermediation (e.g., transport, bulk storage) technologies. As recent developments in 
macroeconomic and trade theory vividly demonstrate, a break from the standard 
assumption of perfectly competitive markets can have monumental impacts on model 
results and policy implications. 
There is long-standing and widespread observation of serious infrastructural 
obstacles - of both the physical and institutional sorts - to market interlinkages and 
efficient agricultural price transmission in African rural markets. For instance, the World 
Bank's [1989] long-term perspective study on African development states that 
"improving rural infrastructure is an essential requirement for the modernization and 
growth of agriculture. Better market incentives to farmers will be blunted if the physical 
barriers and economic costs of transporting goods to and from local markets are too high" 
[p.103]. 
Heavy-handed state interventions in the pricing, interregional movement and 
interseasonal storage of agricultural commodities have drawn equally long and critical 
attention as impediments to more efficient marketing. State agricultural marketing 
boards often become illiquid or run out of sacks, vehicles or storage capacity. 
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Consequently, the spatial and temporal extent of state activities has often been limited 
and inappropriate, forcing many consumers and producers onto an illegal parallel market. 
In the opinion of Harriss [1979a, p.371], state interventions in Africa "induce spatial 
compartmentaliza-tion" despite the common rhetoric of panterritorial and panseasonal 
integration and equity. Government authority often exceeds the limits of both its 
technical competence and its agents' self-restraint, leading to inconsistent application of 
administrative pricing and distribution rules, and widespread rent-seeking. "Chronic 
problems of dis-coordination and discretionary decision-making play into the hands of 
large private traders (who may also be bureaucrats)" [Harriss 1979a, p.371]. Meanwhile, 
the efficiency of the parallel, private market is often low. Widespread government 
restrictions on private marketing activities dampen trade and generally force traders to 
parcelize activities so as to avoid detection, at the expense of higher unit transfer costs 
due to considerable risk premia and volumes suboptimal for the technologies involved. 
In summary, state intervention and corruption often facilitate the emergence and 
consolidatIon of private monopolies and the disintegration of comprehensive national 
distribution networks, exacerbating the very problems market regulation is supposed to 
alleviate. 
The issues of poor infrastructure and governance are also related. In many 
African nations, the publicly developed marketing infrastructure was ill-suited to inter-
regional trade, as distinct from evacuation of export crops to port, in both the colonial and 
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post-independence periods. More generally, poor delivery of services, due often to 
incoherent provision of infrastructure and inadequate maintenance, has often impeded the 
emergence of efficient, responsive trading networks. 
In the ideal world, economic reforms can simultaneously tackle both governance 
and infrastructure problems, and in a few settings it seems they have.2 But in much of 
Africa agricultural liberalization efforts have addressed only failed government 
interventions in agricultural marketing, not the substantial bottlenecks created by 
insufficient and low-quality infrastructure. This has had adverse consequences for 
agricultural supply response, as World Bank analysts acknowledge: "recent experience 
indicates that supply response of structural adjustment operations has been stifled by 
rural transport deficiencies" [Riverson, Gaviria and Thurscott 1991, p.ix]. Some 
commentators even argue that the fiscal retrenchment synonymous with liberalization has 
exacerbated infrastructural problems [Longhurst 1987; Mosley and Smith 1989], which 
leads to an intriguing hypothesis. 
Market Relaxation and State Compression 
Michael Lipton [1990, 1991] has perhaps most clearly conceptualized the 
potential tension inherent in contemporary efforts to improve market performance in 
Africa. Lipton characterizes liberalization as consisting of two distinct, countervailing 
impulses. The first, market relaxation, loosens or eliminates state restrictions on private 
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sector activity.3 The movement away from controlled pricing and physical movement of 
commodities tends to open up space for private intermediaries to operate freely, openly 
and competitively, with potentially positive consequences for smallholders' welfare, 
agricultural production and marketing volumes, and the economy as a whole . . 
Meanwhile, however, the bias in most structural adjustment operations toward 
minimizing the state's role in the economy,4 which Lipton labels "state compression", can 
generate opposing effects that might choke off nascent competition and efficiency gains. 
State compression has four dimensions. First, reduced expenditure on public goods 
infrastructure and services (e.g., maintenance of roads, and bridges, extension services, 
phytosanitary controls, rural policing) forces private industry to bear more of these costs 
alone. This naturally leads to socially suboptimal supply. Increasing undersupply can 
undo the good work done by market relaxation if, for example, roads become impassable 
or marketable production suffers from preventable epidemiological disasters. 
Second, sharp real reductions in government salaries increase local authorities' 
propensityito extort bribes and otherwise obstruct liberalization efforts. 5 There have been 
noteworthy rearguard actions by bureaucrats and local government functionaries to 
impede liberalization in several African nations, including Madagascar. Even though 
central governments declare trade free everywhere, some local authorities have 
introduced their own restrictions, sometimes in the name of local food security, but often 
blatantly to bolster declining real government salaries or to maintain incumbents' market 
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or neopatrimonial political power [Barrett 1994a, Berg 1989, Coulter 1994]. 
Third, restrictive monetary policy and tightened banking prudential oversight 
practices explicitly seek to increase real interest rates and improve the solvency of 
financial institutions, with an eye toward expanding the deposit base of the national 
banking system. But by making credit more expensive, and often less accessible for 
private marketing intermediaries in rural areas, these tendencies can inhibit entry and 
restrict the capacity of intermediaries to invest in capital equipment (e.g., trucks, silos, 
electrical mills) for long-term efficiency gains, or even in commodity inventories for 
interseasonal arbitrage. Panseasonal pricing, even where relatively ineffective, created 
disincentives to investment in and maintenance of bulk storage capacity. One legacy of 
the dirigiste era is thus widespread shortage of private, commercial bulk storage facilities, 
thereby inhibiting interseasonal arbitrage. Thin markets contribute to price volatility, 
which discourages prudent lending and investment in the presence of sunk costs, which 
thin markets further. A vicious cycle easily begins. With parastatals no longer 
stockpiling large quantities of basic foodgrains and few private merchants holding more 
than transactional stocks, many observers maintain that most interseasonal storage is now 
carried out by farmers themselves [Christiansen and Stackhouse 1989; Coulter and Golob 
1992; Coulter 1994]. However, with rudimentary storage technologies, physical loss 
rates can be substantial, in many cases much larger than when state marketing boards 
managed stocks poorly in excessively modem and urban facilities. 
8 
Finally, for all their drawbacks, state marketing boards did provide some services 
that must be replaced, perhaps even extended, in the wake of state withdrawal from 
agricultural marketing. Publicly declared .prices often provided the only baseline market 
price information service, reaching at least those regions where parastatals were active. 
The need for market price information services has been emphasized by Coulter [1994], 
Staatz, Dione and Dembele [1989] and Jones [1972], among others, but has only recently 
found acceptance among governments and donors despite the relatively low cost of 
service provision. Credit for farmers' purchase of modem inputs, and even for hungry 
season consumption goods, was often extended as an advance against cash receipts from 
later produce sales when the state had a working monopsony. Where liberalization has 
opened up competition in farm-level crop purchasing, it has sometimes, as in parts of 
Madagascar, Senegal and Zaire, also had the unfortunate effect of discouraging seasonal 
credit [Thomas and Reintsma 1989; Thompson 1991; Barrett 1994b]. For reasons 
described above, the financial sector is often unable to pick up the slack left by 
parastatalsf retreat. Finally, pre-liberalization informal trading tended to be based more 
on personal relationships within which informal contract enforcement mechanisms exist. 
The depersonalization of exchange relations inherent in freed markets extends marketing 
intermediaries' commercial reach without necessarily simultaneously extending the extra-
legal protection of contracts [platteau 1994a, 1994b]. Parastatals had the dubious benefit 
of state power behind them to help enforce marketing contracts. 6 
In summary, if African agricultural market liberalization is aimed at facilitating 
private trade so as to enhance market integration and harness the Walrasian efficiency of 
free market pricing, such reforms likely demand not just the diminution of state 
restrictions on private sector activity, but equally the rehabilitation, maintenance and 
extension of supporting infrastructure and services through complementary investments 
[Barrett and Carter 1994; Staatz et al. 1993; Yao and Hay 1991]. The need is to build up 
competitive marketing channels where they were long suppressed. Where ex ante state 
controls were effective and injurious, aggressive dismantling ·of parastatal structures may 
be central to attainment of that goal. In other cases, including where state controls were 
relatively ineffective, state compression may be a subordinate concern to issues of 
infrastructure and finance for, as Yao and Hay [1991, p.86] put it, "the assumption that 
mechanisms for state intervention can be dismantled quickly because private traders will 
be willing and able to move into vacated markets is not substantiated by experience. 117 
Markets and Liberalization in Madagascar 
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Madagascar provides a useful setting to explore these claims empirically. State 
involvement in food marketing, which was considerable but varied in efficacy across 
regions and commodities, diminished sharply in the latter half of the 1980s, but provision 
of public goods and services generally did not expand (indeed probably diminished in 
most locations) with liberalization. Examination of how liberalization affected spatial 
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and intertemporal market integration, taking care to control appropriately for the ex ante 
conditions of commodity- and region-specific markets, offers an enlightening empirical 
test of the market relaxation - state compression hypothesis. 
From 1973 the Malagasy government enforced a legal monopsony in the purchase 
of rice, manioc, maize and dried beans (as well as several commodities not considered 
here), and a monopoly in the distribution, processing and commercial storage of those 
commodities. The state's hold on these markets varied across regions, time and 
commodities. With respect to rice, the principal crop, AIRD [1984] estimated official 
purchases at 10-20 percent of domestic paddy production. With the marketed proportion 
of production generally believed to be about one-quarter, the official marketing channel 
probably controlled half or more of marketed rice, quite a high figure. An enforcement 
agency, the Brigade Mixte d'Intervention Economique (BMIE), seized illegal stocks, 
usually of rice, and arrested those caught or suspected of trading illegally. The BMIE's 
operations, as well as those of the state marketing boards, were concentrated in the 
regions around the five principal cities (Antananarivo, Antsirabe, Fianarantsoa, 
Mahajanga, and Toamasina)8 and the main rice producing region (Ambatondrazaka). If 
market relaxation enhances intertemporal or spatial market integration, one would expect 
measurable improvements where government controls were strongest and only weak 
effects, if any, where government exercised little control. 
State restrictions over food marketing were wholly eliminated over the span of a 
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few years in the mid-1980s. Domestic and international trade in foods was fully opened 
to competition, government price controls and consumer subsidies were loosened then 
eliminated, and several of the larger public agricultural enterprises were disbanded or 
privatized. International observers such as the IMF, World Bank and USAID .celebrated 
the breadth and depth of Madagascar's market-oriented reforms [Barrett 1994a]. 
Yet while state interventions in agricultural marketing receded markedly, the 
Malagasy state has continuously neglected rural infrastructure over the past two decades, 
as detailed below. With the exception of only a few enclaves, there has been no 
significant infrastructural improvement to accompany state withdrawal from agricultural 
marketing. If the market relaxation-state compression hypothesis is true - that state 
compression can choke off nascent gains from market relaxation - one would expect to 
see little if any improvement in market integration indicators among those regions where 
infrastructure has been and remains underdeveloped. 
Spatial Market Integration 
We can test the market relaxation-state compression hypotheses, as well as get a 
strong indication of the degree to which price shocks are transmitted across spatially 
distinct geographical markets, by considering the effects of liberalization measures on 
market integration. Unfortunately, there are no compelling methods available for such 
testing [Harriss 1979b; McNew 1994; Barrett forthcoming], so I rely on simple 
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techniques applied to monthly retail food price data from each of Madagascar's 17 
agricultural enumeration areas.9 Common inflationary and seasonal trends in the regional 
price data were removed from the data by deflating the nominal data by the national 
consumer price index, then deseasonalizing using the ratio-to-moving-average method. 10 
This cleaning renders the data stationary, so all the series are trivially co integrated, 
eliminating that increasingly popular method and Ravallion's[ 1986] error-correction 
mechanism specification as testing options. Consequently, bivariate correlation 
coefficients among the deflated, deseasonalized price series form the basis for the present 
analysis. These correlations are computed both on the price levels and on their first 
differences, so as to adjust for autocorrelation. 1 1 
The regional price series for each commodity were divided into two groups 
accordingly to ex ante market conditions: seven (more urban) regions where the state's 
marketing presence was pronounced and infrastructure is relatively good,I2 and ten 
regions where the state's marketing presence was never as pervasive and the 
infrastructUre was and remains relatively poor. The analysis that follows addresses three 
distinct questions concerning spatial market integration: (1) how strong are intermarket 
prices linkages? This offers a good indicator of the extent of the central government's 
influence through price-based policy measures. (2) Have liberalization measures 
improved market integration? Finally, (3), have the effects of liberalization differed 
between the "primary regions", where state control had been significant and infrastructure 
is functional, and the "secondary regions" , where state control was much weaker and 
infrastructure was and remains quite decrepit? 
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Table 1 presents the proportions of sample correlation coefficients between 
regional price levels that were statistically significantly greater than zero ("minimally 
integrated") pre- and post-liberalization, that were greater than 0.713 ("reasonably well 
integrated") pre- and post-liberalization, and that experienced statistically significant 
changes with liberalization, either negative or positive. These results are reported in 
three panels: market integration within primary regions, between primary and secondary 
regions, then within secondary regions. Several findings are immediately apparent. 
First, other than for rice, most of the market pairs were not even minimally 
integrated before liberalization, while considerably more were after liberalization. 
Except for manioc, all the primary region market pairs were minimally integrated for 
each crop post-liberalization, and at least 80 percent were minimally integrated with 
secondary region markets as well. This would appear to suggest liberalization brought at 
least minimal, broadly-based interconnectedness. Within secondary regions, the 
proportion of minimally integrated markets was unambiguously lower post-liberalization 
than within primary regions, indicating that infrastructural obstacles in more remote 
regions remained a serious impediment to marketing efficiency. 
Statistical tests for a structural change in correlation coefficients also showed 
positive improvements in a substantial number of series linked to primary regions. Note, 
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however, that the secondary regions consistently have a lower proportion of market pairs 
showing positive structural shifts than do the primary regions; indeed, many evince 
market disintegration. As hypothesized, liberalization's positive, market relaxation 
impacts appear to have been most concentrated where the state's influence, ex ante, and 
the quality and density of infrastructure, ex post, were greatest. The proportions of 
correlation coefficients exceeding 0.70 likewise suggest an important jump in market 
integration among primary region markets, but much less so among secondary region 
markets. The law of one price seems to apply only to a spatial subset of Malagasy food 
markets. Moreover, with the exception of rice and dried beans within the primary region 
markets, less than half of the market pairs are reasonably well integrated (defined as r > 
0.70), and only ten percent of the market pairs within secondary region markets are 
reasonably well integrated. From these results it would seem that liberalization had 
mildly positive, commodity- and, especially, regionally-differentiated effects on market 
integration, but that domestic food markets remain only weakly integrated with one 
another, substantially limiting the capacity of central government price policy to 
influence the incentives faced by farmers in the hinterland. 
One concern regarding the correlations underlying Table 1 is that parallel 
econometric work [Barrett 1994c] indicates that the autocorrelation of the univariate food 
price series jumped markedly with liberalization. Autocorrelation inflates the estimated 
correlation coefficients, so the sample statistics presented in Table 1 are likely upper 
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bounds on the true population correlations. One simple way to address this problem is to 
correlate the first differences of the regional price series [Stigler and Sherwin 1985]. One 
is then explicitly measuring the extent to which price shocks in one market are 
contemporaneously felt in the other market. Of course, since the series were already 
stationary, this method "over-differences" the data, so the corresponding figures likely 
present lower bound estimates to juxtapose the upper bound estimates in Table 1. 
Table 2 replicates the statistics of Table 1, now for correlations among first-
differenced series. The story changes noticeably. Now liberalization still s~ems to have 
net positive, but quite limited effects. No more than one-fifth of the market pairs for any 
commodity were minimally integrated prior to liberalization, and the proportion improves 
only moderately, to a maximum of 67 percent (for rice within the primary regions) with 
liberalization. Within the primary region, there is noticeable (if rarely statistically 
significant) improvement in minimal market integration. But in the secondary regions 
the proportion of minimally integrated market pairs falls for two commodities and is 
unchanged"for the other two. The proportion of statistically significant structural changes 
in correlation coefficients is quite small for all commodities and regions. Perhaps most 
significantly, no market pairs' first-differenced prices exhibit a correlation coefficient 
exceeding 0.70 in either period. These lower bound estimates suggest minimal impacts 
from liberalization, with perhaps some positive impacts in primary regions largely offset 
by market disintegration in secondary regions. These figures thus tell a less positive 
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story than those of Table 1, suggesting that liberalization was rather ineffective in 
improving intermarket price efficiency, and, consequently, that government price policy 
is unlikely to be a very effective tool for eliciting desired production, consumption or 
marketing responses in the market environment of contemporary Madagascar. Between 
the two bounding sets of estimates, the general impression is that spatial market 
integration improved substantially more in the primary regions than in the secondary 
ones, but remains sharply limited in both. 
Continuing Obstacles To Food Market Integration 
The market for dried beans provides an interesting demonstration of the difficulty 
of reversing state takeover of a marketing channel. 14 The bean market was completely 
free, and characterized by vertically integrated private trading operations (from farmgate 
collection through urban distribution) until the state vested itself with legal monopoly 
powers in bean marketing in 1973. Some existing bean traders became collectors for the 
state societies, but most appear to have left the market entirely. From about 1986, 
officially free competition returned. But in the meantime, both rural infrastructure and 
security had degraded. Without established interregional correspondent networks, and 
faced with significant costs and risks to operating outside their own locale, bean traders 
have become quite localized, with just a few very large wholesalers making the rural-
urban linkages. Wholesalers are reluctant to extend cash advances to collectors, both due 
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to a lack of repayment enforcement mechanisms and to rural insecurity in the principal 
bean-growing areas of the western highlands. So while private trade has recovered, it is 
now far more fractured, with greater transactions costs, than before nationalization. The 
period of parastatal control has had a lasting impact on the way markets organize 
presently, with significant consequences for price transmission and trading efficiency. 
Liberalization brought an end to a quantity-rationed state distribution network and 
the resulting composite market system that had prevailed for the preceding decade or so. 
There now appears to be increased competition at the collection, processing and retailing 
levels of the food marketing chains, and the marketing network extends further into the 
countryside than it had previously [Abt Associates 1991; World Bank 1991 a; my 
unpublished data]. But there is little evidence of increased competition in regions where 
transport and communications infrastructure remain substantially inoperative, nor at the 
wholesaler level, at which most interregional trade and interseasonal commercial storage 
takes place in Madagascar [Abt Associates 1991]. 
Continued inefficient government control over fuel distribution has led to 
widespread shortages of diesel in rural areas (and of gasoline in urban ones). Meanwhile 
regular shortages of foreign exchange have shrunk the supply of vehicles and spare parts. 
Government activity thus continues to hamper transport. 
Moreover, in many areas local governments continue to enforce restrictions on the 
physical movement and pricing of food commodities. Berg [1989, p.727] reports 
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"propensities to stifle competition are strong and widespread, emanating especially from 
the trading and rice producing parastatals and local officials," and recounts stories of road 
closings by FIF ABE officials in the Maravoay basin during the 1985 harvest and 
collusion among officials in the Lac Alaotra area in the year immediately following the 
termination of SOMALAC's legal monopoly. Azam et al. [1993] report similar stories 
from the far west and north, and Abt Associates [1991] offer further anecdotes. It has 
clearly been difficult to transition to a free market system. 
Roads remain a serious problem to food marketing and thus to price transmittal 
and elicitation of a sustainable agricultural supply response. 15 Bad roads inhibit the 
evacuation of agricultural commodities, especially from more remote areas, and impede 
the timely delivery of modern inputs and incentive consumer goods. Poor roads also 
facilitate the oligopsonistic organization of collection, 16 which dampens supply 
responsiveness by depressing farmers' returns. Szal [1988, p.749] claims that "producer 
prices play less of a motivational role in production decisions than the lack of inputs and 
poor transport," and that this contention is supported by regression analysis. The W orId 
Bank [1991b, p.2] states bluntly that "the overall condition of rural roads remains dismal. 
At present, about 90 percent of the estimated 40,000 kilometers are in bad to fair 
condition." UND P IMEP [1991] estimated that less than one percent of all roads are 
asphalted (declining from 1.7 percent in the Highlands to 0.2 percent in the far north and 
south). Pryor [1990] could find no evidence of a comprehensive government 
transportation plan because "according to the Director of the Planning Office, the 
government 'forgot' to provide normal funds for road maintenance" [p.322]. 
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Where the government has more recently attempted to consolidate and improve 
the rural roads network, it has often met with fierce resistance from local governments, 
for two main reasons. First, banditry (dahalo) is widely believed to have increased 
substantially in the 1980s,I7 and many fokontany leadership councils express a belief that 
better roads will only make their villages less defensible. 18 Second, poor infrastructure 
protects the profitable oligopsony/oligopoly positions of many local elites by impeding 
entry by outsiders [Barrett 1994a]. There are thus incentives at the local government 
level to avoid rehabilitation and maintenance of roads that might improve producer 
incentives and market integration. 
It is not just the infrastructure that is in bad shape. Berthelemy [1988], citing 
Ministry of Transport data, reports that the average age of the stock of road haulage 
equipment was greater than ten years, and half was out of commission in the mid-1980s. 
The disincentives created by panterritorial official pricing and foreign exchange rationing 
during the 1970s and early 1980s effectively choked off replacement- much less 
expansion - of Madagascar's rolling stock in the pre-liberalization era. The legacy 
bequeathed to the post-reform era is one of transport bottlenecks that inihibit competition 
and trade. Vehicle operating costs on poorly maintained roads are almost half again as 
much as on good ones [Barrett 1994b]. Moreover, poor roads routinely become 
impassable, especially in the rainy season, requiring evacuation by draught animal or 
headloading, at two to ten times the cost of motorized transport, respectively [Abt 
Associates 1991; World Bank 1991b]. The World Bank [1991b] concludes that 
"the rural roads sub-sector ... has not been affected by the policy reform 
efforts. The poor condition of roads still requires emphasis on complete 
rehabilitation. On-going projects, although allocating a substantial 
amount of resources, are proceeding independently outside a rational 
framework for intervention. As a result, the roads rehabilitated under 
several on-going rural road projects have little prospects of receiving any 
maintenance" [p.5] 
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In light of these substantial, continuing infrastructural and institutional obstacles, 
it is perhaps unsurprising that Madagascar's food markets appear only weakly integrated 
overall, with quite economically isolated enclaves. The capacity of government policies 
to affect prices in a predictable, stimulative manner cannot be great under such 
circumstances, with a distinctly limited effective geographic range. 
Intertemporal Market Integration 
Matters are no better when one considers the effects of liberalization on 
interseasonal price variability. Azam et al. [1993] and the World Bank [1991a] report 
substantial seasonal price increases, apparently well in excess of borrowing and storage 
costs estimated at from 20-40 percent. They attribute this chiefly to insufficient credit 
available to traders. The World Bank [1991a] estimates that rice obtains more than 80 
percent of all agricultural trading credit. Even so, less than 25 percent of marketed rice is 
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financed by bank credits, with almost 90 percent of the credit going to just three 
geographic regions. Credit controls imposed by the Central Bank - especially on BTM, 
the commercial bank with the broadest network - have seriously impinged on 
borrowing by rural marketing agents. This has important implications for interseasonal 
storage and price stability. Most large rice traders only collect paddy in the countryside 
for 4-6 months each year, although some smaller traders continue in areas where the 
roads are good until the heaviest rains come in December. But during the depth of the 
soudure, December-March, farmers must transport paddy to market themselves, so there 
is a certain seasonality to market integration. Azam et al. [1993] conclude that 
liberalization did not improve interseasonal price patterns. Indeed the data in Table 3 
suggest that once one controls for the effects of a seasonal rice buffer stock facility 
introduced in late 1986 and terminated in 1990, liberalization brought sharp increases in 
interseasonal price variability. 
If one takes the year-specific seasonal indices generated by the ratio-to-moving 
average method of deseasonalizing the regional real commodity price series for spatial 
market integration testing, and calculates the maximum/minimum ratio of the monthly 
indices, an estimate of the average intra-annual price increase emerges. Table 3 presents 
these estimates for three distinct periods: pre-liberalization (1983-85), the period of rice 
buffer stock operations (November 1986-March 1990), and the post-liberalization period 
outside of the buffer stock era. As with the statistics regarding spatial market integration, 
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the data are separated into the primary and secondary regions on the basis of ex ante 
government control over food marketing channels and the ex post condition of supporting 
infrastructure. The regionally-differentiated effects of buffer stock operations and 
liberalization on interseasonal price increases are striking, and quite consistent with the 
findings of urban bias in price risk [Barrett 1995]. 
If the costs of seasonal storage, including interest, handling and commercial 
storage losses, are on the order of 20-40 percent, as has been estimated by the W orid 
Bank [1991a] and Azam et ale [1993], it is clear that most commodities have consistently 
displayed unusually large interseasonal price increases. In the preliberalization period 
only beans and rice in the secondary regions had average increases in this range. 
Interestingly, during the pre-liberalization period the periodic increase in food prices was 
generally less in the secondary regions, where government controls were less ubiquitous 
and effective, than in the primary regions around the major metropoli. 19 This situation 
was quickly reversed with liberalization, however, as the primary regions - which 
enjoy supetior access to credit, all-weather transport, and bulk commercial storage-
saw much lower rates of interseasonal price increases.2o Still, interseasonal price changes 
lept with liberalization. Of the 57 commodity and region-specific price series in the data 
set, 50 saw an increase in interseasonal rates, with 27 more than doubling from one 
period to the next. 25 of the 57 series have averaged seasonal monthly price peaks more 
than double the monthly minima since liberalization. The most likely reasons for the 
sharp rise in interseasonal price ratios are the tightening credit situation, the diminished 
threat of government price controls, and the reduced role of the state societies, which, 
unlike most private traders, enjoyed ample bulk storage capacity and credit to maintain 
interseasonal stocks. 
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The rice buffer stock facility, introduced explicitly to temper sharp seasonal 
increases in rice prices that emerged immediately following the most significant food 
market liberalization measures, seems to have dampened interseasonal margins, 
particularly in the primary regions, where three-quarters of the price series saw a decrease 
in seasonal price rises from the pre-liberalization period to the buffer stock period. The 
evidence is more mixed in the secondary regions where, except for rice, median price 
rises are lower, but most price series evince greater seasonal price increases in the buffer 
stock period than prevailed before liberalization. Since the facility operated almost 
entirely in urban areas (especially Antananarivo and Toamasina, the principal storage 
sites), it should come as little surprise that the positive effects of buffer stock operations 
were concentrated in those regions. 
The seasonal food price increases in Table 3 are not unusual for Sub-Saharan 
Africa. For example, Coulter [1994] reports that interseasonal maize price increases in 
Ghana average 120-170 percent across regional markets. He too emphasizes the 
weakness of the financial sector as the proximate cause for substantial interseasonal price 
variability: "a major reason for interseasonal price variability ... is the weakness of the 
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financial sectors in most African countries. Most countries have embarked on financial 
reform, ... but this is a slow process which often lags far behind reforms in grain 
marketing. Moreover, after capital restructuring, bankers are generally conservative and 
reluctant to lend to cereal traders, most of whom are unknown to them, keep no formal 
accounts and are considered a poor lending risk" [Coulter 1994, p. 25]. 
Panseasonal official pricing and government-controlled credit rationing created 
serious disincentives to the maintenance or expansion of private bulk storage capacity in 
the pre-liberalization years. The resulting shortfall in storage capacity, and significant 
concentration in the hands of a very few large trading houses, has created serious 
problems for intertemporal arbitrage. Moreover, less than half of national commercial 
stockage capacity is accessible year-round [Fivoarana 1989]; much of it is intended for 
transactional, as opposed to interseasonal, inventories. Storage losses among big, 
commercial traders are relatively low, at 1-3 percent annually [Azam et al. 1993; my 
unpublished data]. On-farm loss rates, by contrast, are quite high: 11-26 percent, 
depending on region, season and technologies employed [MPARAIF AO 1987]. So the 
lack of interseasonal commercial storage facilities inevitably generates considerable 
waste due to higher than necessary loss rates. High loss rates, private credit rationing that 
generates quite high shadow interest rates, and the substantial problems of crop 
movement when rural market demand peaks during the rainy season all combine to drive 
exceedingly high interseasonal price variability. Liberalization appears only to have 
25 
exacerbated this situation. 
Conclusions 
The empirical results from Madagascar support the hypothesis of countervailing 
market relaxation and state compression effects of liberalization measures. Relatedly, 
this paper demonstrates there are important interregional and seasonal differences in the 
way price shocks are transmitted within Madagascar's food subsectors. These differences 
mute substantially the influence central government policy measures have on the 
incentives faced by rural consumers, producers and marketing intermediaries, an 
influence presumed in the expectation of a robust supply response to improved prices. 
These findings are consistent with the broader literature on African agricultural 
liberalization, which emphasizes the twin necessities of dismantling inefficient and 
inequitable state restrictions on trade and of improving the density and quality of 
supporting infrastructure and services, particularly in communications, finance, storage, 
and transport. 
The World Bank [1991a, p.31] sums up its assessment of the generally sluggish 
response of Malagasy agriculture to liberalization measures thus: 
"A major reason which explains the limited supply response from the agricultural 
sector is the pervasive deficiency of rural markets in Madagascar. Rural market 
inefficiencies are related to four structural constraints: an inadequate rural 
infrastructure, inappropriate government intervention and regulation on 
commodity and input markets, inefficient provision of public services, and 
deficiencies with the rural financial market." 
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In a similar spirit, Jayne [1994] points out that while improved crop productivity may 
have substantial long-run potential, in the medium-run more efficient rural food 
marketing networks may be more important to stimulating agricultural commercialization 
and to the evolution of cropping patterns according to comparative advantage~ Generally 
speaking, insufficient attention has been paid to issues surrounding the architecture and 
functioning of agricultural markets in the design and implementation of policy reform 
measures aimed at stimulating a strong, sustainable agricultural supply response. In 
Madagascar, such oversights likely lie at the heart of the poor and uneven performance of 
the agricultural economy in the wake of liberalization, and in the mixed effects of 
market-oriented reforms on spatial and intertemporal market integration. 
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Endnotes 
* Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Utah State University, Logan, UT 84322-3530 
USA. Michael Carter and Jean-Paul Chavas provided helpful comments. Any remaining errors are the 
author's alone. 
1. That is, Pt+/Pt = R(1 +r)/(1-d), where t indexes time periods, R is a risk adjustment coefficient, r 
is the real interest rate and d is the rate of decay of the commodity. While d is strictly nonnegative, r is 
unrestricted. Indeed, achieving positive real interest rates where fmancial repression has long made them 
negative has been an explicit objective of monetary reforms in African adjustment programs. R is also 
unrestricted since the risks of speculative storage may be either negatively or positively correlated with the 
stochastic returns to other assets [Chavas 1988]. 
2. Ghana is the obvious example. More than half the World Bank's disbursements in the initial 
1983-1986 period of structural adjustment ($192 million) went toward rehabilitation of infrastructure and 
services distribution systems, notably roads, ports, telecommunications, the power grid and water supply 
[Mosley, Harrigan and Toye 1991]. At the same time, the government began rolling back its interventions 
in crop marketing, which had been relatively mild, by African standards, for food crops [Coulter 1994]. 
The reasonably robust response of Ghanaian agricultural productivity and supply [Barrett and Carter 
forthcoming] and relatively efficient linkages among its domestic agricultural markets[(Alderman 1993] 
likely follow in part from this parallel pursuit of improved infrastructure and governance. 
3. By Lipton's defmition [1991, p.27], "market relaxation is the removal of restraints upon 
movement of relative prices, quantities, and qualities of commodities and factors exchanged towards levels 
that clear the markets." One should acknowledge, as Lipton does, that the case for market relaxation is not 
new. Among others, Myrdal [1968] focused heavily on this theme. 
4. Lipton [1991] suggests that this bias was initially due to extreme neoliberal ideology but since 
the latter 1980s, and more durably, is due to protracted fiscal crises in reforming economies. 
5. Klitgaard [1989] labels this phenomenon "incentive myopia" in his vivid description of the 
perversities of economic reform efforts in Equatorial Guinea. 
6. Of course, parastatals themselves have often been able to renege on contracts without penalty. 
Delivery of promissory notes - payable only many months later in a highly inflationary environment -
instead of cash is but one too-common example. 
7. Lipton [1991, p.27] puts it more colorfully: "Just as there is no free lunch, so there is no free 
market; markets are expensive. Agricultural risk and information are so structured that growing state 
involvement is usually a prerequisite of effective [market relaxation]." 
8. Some studies [e.g., Pryor 1988, 1990] include Antsiranana and Toliary in the urban group 
since they are among the largest population centers. For present purposes, however, they are excluded 
because they were never well integrated into the national distribution network. Indeed, neglect of the far 
south (Toliary) and the far north (Antsiranana) has been a cornerstone of regional political opposition, 
most notably by the Toliary-based MONlMA party. 
9. The data are thoroughly discussed in Barrett [1994b]. 
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10. Specifically, monthly real observations are divided by a twelve-month centered moving 
average, in order to remove common trend and cyclical components in the data. The year-specific monthly 
seasonals were then averaged to estimate a seasonal index (i.e., all the January specific seasonals were 
averaged to generate the January index). 
11. More general cross-correlation functions were also estimated to establish whether 
contemporaneous correlations understate linkages that might be delayed due to contracts, imperfect 
information flow or delivery lags. A cross-correlation function provides a dynamic generalization of the 




(k) = [V(PI) V(P2)] 2 cpIP2(k) 
N-Ic 
N-1E (Plt-Jl1)(PU.k-Jl2) , k~O, 
where cp p (k) = t.~ 
12 -l~ 
N ~ (Plt-Jl I)(PU£Jl2)' k<O 
t . l-lc 
Jl j is the mean of series i 
V(Pj) is the variance of series i 
The cross-correlation results generally support the contemporaneous correlation specification employed 
here. 
12. These are the six regions mentioned above as well as one (Itasy, immediately west of 
Antananarivo) that has benefitted from a bevy of infrastructural projects over the past 6-8 years 
[FAO/IFAD 1991; UNDPfMEP 1991]. 
13. Above this level variation in one price explains half or more of the variation in the other. 
14. This paragraph draws heavily on Rabenarivo [1992]. 
15. The paragraphs on rural roads draw heavily from Barrett [1994a]. 
16. As well as the oligopolistic .organization of distribution. 
17. 'Although there is no supporting data, these claims are widespread [Abt Associates 1991; 
Deveze 1990; FAOIIFAD 1991; Hewitt 1992]. Much of this is likely attributable to the stress of prolonged 
recession, but reduced real expenditures on policing, especially in rural zones, has no doubt facilitated the 
growing problem. 
18. When discussing road conditions, a surprising number of local officials invoke the words of 
the early nineteenth century Merina king, Radama I: "If I make roads, the white man will only come and 
take my country. I have two allies: forest (hazo) and fever (tazo)." The enemies may have changed, but 
the strategy remains. 
19. This reinforces Harriss' [1979a] claim that parastatal food marketing tends to amplify rather 
than dampen seasonal price variability. 
20. The one exception to this is maize, for which there is only one secondary region observation. 
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Table 1 
Proportions of Correlation Coefficients (in levels) 
(percent) Minimally Structural Reasonably Well 
Integratec:r Changeb In tegratecf 
Commodify pre-lib post-lib positive negative pre-lib post-lib 
Within primary regions' 
Dried beans 40 100 60 0 20 70 
Maize 40 100 20 0 0 40 
Manioc 7 53 33 0 0 13 
Potatoes 30 100 60 10 0 30 
Rice 76 100 38 0 14 95 
Between primary and secondary regions 
Dried beans 30 83 23 3 3 20 
Maize 40 100 0 0 0 0 
Manioc 24 83 24 0 0 12 
Potatoes 8 83 60 0 0 40 
Rice 70 91 26 4 19 46 
Within secondary regionse 
Dried beans 47 47 13 27 0 7 
Maize' 
Manioc 24 33 14 10 0 10 
Potatoes 10 70 50 0 0 10 
Rice 67 89 22 11 7 13 
a Ho:p=O rejected in favor of positive one-sided alternative at the 5 percent or lower significance level. 
b Ho:p pre =p post rejected in favor of a two-sided alternative at the 5 percent or lower significance level. 
C Sample r> .70. 
d Ambatondrazaka, Fianarantsoa, Imerina Centrale, Itasy, Mahajanga, Toamasina, Vakinankaratra. 
e Antalaha, Antsiranana, Antsohihy, Farafangana, Fenerive Est, Maintirano, Mananjary, Morondava, 
Taolagnaro, Toliary. 
fMaize data are available for only one secondary region. 
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Table 2 
Proportions of Correlation Coefficients (in first differences) 
(percent) Minimally Structural Reasonably Well 
Integratecr Changeb Integratecf 
Commodity pre-lib post-lib positive negative pre-lib post-lib 
Within primary regionsJ 
Dried beans 0 40 0 0 0 
Maize 0 30 10 0 0 
Manioc 7 33 13 0 0 
Potatoes 0 20 0 0 0 
Rice 14 67 19 0 0 
Between primary and secondary regions 
Dried beans 13 17 30 30 0 
Maize 0 0 0 0 0 
Manioc 5 24 7 2 0 
Potatoes 4 0 8 0 0 
Rice 10 33 7 1 0 
Within secondary regionsJ 
Dried beans 13 7 0 0 0 
Maizee J 
Manioc 19 19 5 10 0 
Potatoes 10 0 0 10 0 
Rice 9 9 0 0 0 
a Ho:p=O rejected in favor of positive one-sided alternative at the 5 percent or lower 
significance level. 
b Ho:p pre ~p post rejected in favor of a two-sided alternative at the 5 percent or lower 
significance level. 
C Sample r> .70. 
d See Table 1 for list of regions. 

















Average Intra-annual Price Changes 
(maximum/minimum monthly indices, by period) 
(percent) 
Commodity 
Pre-liberalizationa Buffer stock periodb 
median median % decreasing' 
Primary regionse 
Dried beans 42.9 19.9 
Maize 82.4 57.1 
Manioc 59.2 75.9 
Potatoes 65.0 22.7 
Rice 47.1 37.7 
Secondary regionse 
Dried beans 28.8 27.1 
Maizee 67.2 32.5 
Manioc 106.3 70.2 
Potatoes 46.7 44.3 
Rice 38.9 40.0 
a Jan 1983-Dec 1985. 
b Nov 1986-Mar 1990. 
C Jan-Oct 1986, Apr 1990-Dec 1991. 
d Relative to the pre-liberalization period. 












median % decreasing' 
51.0 0 
137.2 20 
103.9 17 
81.0 40 
94.6 0 
69.5 0 
60.6 100 
158.9 14 
102.7 20 
119.6 0 
